'The Theory of Communicative Action'
Jürgen Habermas
Presentation translated by Poyan Taherloo 2019
https://modernityandrationality.blogspot.com/2020/01/the-theory-of-communicative-action-1981.html
'Teorien om den kommunikative handlen'
Jürgen Habermas
Redegørelse udarbejdet af Poyan Taherloo 2008
https://modernitetogrationalitet.blogspot.com/2016/04/teorien-om-den-kommunikative-handlen.html
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'The angry hindu: cultural mobilization in the global modernity'
Thomas Blom Hansen
GRUS No. 41 1993
Translated by Poyan Taherloo 2019
EXTRACT
Globalization as hypermodernity
Globalization as social, economic and cultural process is born with the modern world. Economically as imperialism, politically and militarily as colonialism, and culturally as universalism. Globalization processes have their origin in the western modernity, and in the political discourses in many non-western societies globalization, particularly economic and cultural globalization, is still equated with westernization and cultural imperialism. Historically seen this analysis is correct, and as political slogan the equation between globalization and “westernization” still has substantial potential in the global periphery. In contrast it is more problematic in analytic concern to maintain a such “generic essentialism”, why the modernity as horizon of experience, capitalism/industrialism as paradigms of accumulation and development, and the democratic discourse as paradigms of legitimacy and sovereignty - all western in generic sense - have long since been deterritorialized and repatriated everywhere in the world. To perceive the continuing prevalence and local anchoring of the antagonistic logics of the modernity on a global scale as an effect of a continuous reproduction of western hegemony on all levels is unlikely any analytically fertile basis. The modernity has in many different incarnations and economic development models long since taken deep roots in very different societies and has here crystalized itself in wayward, repatriated ways of development and logics.
Globalization is so in historical terms the process wherethrough a global and heterogenous modernity is established. The present experience of globalization as a steadily more pressing, penetrating and autonomous process, and the establishment of this as an independent social scientific field of research, must therefore, as Giddens points out, be seen as a radicalization of the modernity (Giddens, 1990). Giddens points out, that one of the most pivotal dynamics of the modernity exactly is the progressive separation between time and space: Modernitys’ maybe most radical transformation of individuals’ and societies’ realization and experience horizon is exactly the formation of a universal, homogenous determining of time. Everyone on the globe today lives in the same time - in calendar, yearly calendar time and in a global time zone regime, that irreversibly and radically has created a common, homogenous and “empty” time. That is a time, that is abstract and unbound to places and events. Events take place in the time, but no localized event can change the times’ inexorable passage, that continues - empty, open and universal. When CNN’s slogan “The sun is always rising somewhere on the globe” can be experienced as an announcement of a new globalized era, it is exactly due to, that CNN actualizes and in a new form represents the universal synchronous time that the modernity has created. With CNN the global synchronous time can now be “inhabited” in a new effective way.
The concept of time was also standardized diachronically, as a universal, neutral historic series of sequences - one chronology - that all current and historical societies are localized in. The chronology as a homogenous, global sequence has not only become pivotal for the establishment of a generalized historic consciousness. It is also pivotal in civilizational hierarchization and nationalistic relations of rivalry. A civilizations’, or nations’, self-consciousness is vitally constructed around its age and prior greatness. In relation to other nations’ relative youth or primitivity in the corresponding sequence in the homogenous diachronic time modernity constructed.
The place, or locality, is relativized in similar sense by the European expansion with the establishment of abstract and universal representations of space. Firstly in the geographical map, later in the globe, and finally in the colonial empires, where the global space is ultimately mastered. “The sun never sets on the British Empire” became the slogan of the first global empire. The same empire, that created the still valid global time regime. In the same way as the time is standardized as neutral units, the space is also objectified and standardized in comparable and neutral measures. One square kilometer is principally the same everywhere on the globe. As with the diachronic time dimension also territory became comparable, and object of construction of hierarchies between societies in regard to size and of the national identification processes, that ideologically and emotionally took the abstract, national territory in possession.
The universalization and homogenization of the time and the space created the conditions of possibility for the construction of national consciousness and nations, that in their own way came to constitute the primary, demarcated unit, within which the modern societies where established and envisaged (Anderson, 1991). But the national unit as an operational and coherent reality presupposed exactly also the realization of a greater outside world, arranged in similar national units. The national community and the national state where also a way to organize and control the dynamic universalism of the modernity. And a way to limit and control the modernitys’ principal separation and repealing of time and space. The separation of time and space and the universalization so result in, that many different events different places on the globe potentially can be connected by their temporary coexistence. The European empires mastered the global space for one by inserting the societies in the global periphery in universal diachronic ranking. The colonies existed in an underdeveloped historical sequence and thereby on a lower civilizational level. When one left Europe and traveled out in the periphery, one also moved oneself back and downwards in the universal historic sequence. With the decolonization this diachronic distance was repealed, at least ideologically, and with the recent decades of global communicational revolution the universal synchronic time was crystalized as experienced reality, and the global universal space as potentially accessible to everyone. It is in other words the gradual realization of a universal synchronic time, that radicalizes the modernity, that undermines the significance of the space, the place, and thereby drives the globalization processes.
Any modern or modernized society is affected by local processes of spatial and maybe temporal separated processes by modern institutions’ and modern means of communications’ transcending and habitation of a principally homogenous space with homogenic time. This also means, that localized problems or institutions can be “raised out” of their local context and generalized and repatriated in a new locality. This process (which Giddens calls “dis-embedding - re-embedding”) is just as pivotal, as it is relatively unproblematic in a modern capitalistic economy, a modern state administration, and in production of ideological/cultural processes within the framework of a society organized as sovereign national state - the dominating political and social form of the modernity. The expression unproblematic should not be understood, as if a such homogenization and development process if free from conflict. But in contrast as clearly structured within the framework of a society with formally and relatively transparent power structures and a defined power center inscribed in a universalized discourse of national states and popular sovereignty.
The expansion logic of the modernity and its continuous relativization of societies, identities and established truths are principally driven by the same time-space separation and its gradual anchoring in non-western societies. This expansion is in contrast is problematic in a differently radical way, as it does not happen within a similarly demarcated space regulated by a national stately discourse of legitimacy. The global space is structures and divided in national states, whose sovereignty economically, culturally and politically is constantly undermined by the global expansion of modernity.
Colonialism stretched the western powers’ national space globally and made, among many other things, the global space to an arena for interstate competition between dominating imperial powers.
The first phase in the globalization process, which Ronald Robertson calls the “take-off”-phase of globalization, had a number of non-intended consequences, for example the deterritorialization or “the export” of secularization and democratic and national discourses of popular sovereignty and cultural pride (Hansen, 1992). Local intelligentsias’ and elites’ repatriating of these discourses and the new world order under Pax Americana created the basis for the second phase of the globalization, the national movements and revolutions in the postwar era, and the establishment of a qualitatively new and expansive global capitalism.
The organization of the global order in the 1st, the 2nd, and the 3rd world “fixated” the globalization processes in two ways: Partly in a global competitive relation between east and west and partly in a continuously challenged and problematic dominance and dependence relation between these blocks and their respective “clients” in the 3rd world.
With the 2nd worlds’ gradual opening from 1985 and its ultimate breakdown in 1989 the globalization processes took, economically, politically and culturally, a new and radical turn. The world was no longer divided, but principally open. If the post-colonial reorganization of the world can be said to be the second phase of the globalization, the 1980’s can be said to mark the breakthrough of the third intensive phase of the globalization. The experience of living in an interdependent and principally open world became reel in one stroke, both as potential and as threat.
Previous to the fall of the Berlin wall had gone decades of dynamic capitalistic expansion on global level and an intensive technological development, that from the 1960’s and forward created technical conditions for a jump in opportunities for global electronic communication, the spread of satellite-TV, and so forth. In the 1980’s the global level was crystalized as a relative autonomous level with its own expansion logics (Robertson, 1990), with its own transnational ‘creolized’ culture and lifeforms (Hannerz, 1990). The accelerating globalization did however not produce a constantly more smooth, homogenous and westernized global homogeneity. It created in contrast the contours of, what Arjun Appadurai has called a “Global cultural economy”, that is a growing “trade” with and exchange of institutional, political and cultural forms. The globalization deepened - or radicalized - thereby the differentiation of institutions, markets and cultural cycles, that is characteristic for the modern society. Appadurai points out five areas, that particularly have taken on an autonomous global logic: The financial cycle, that with new technological opportunities in staggering haste moves massive values around the world in seconds, and for which the national economies are no obstacle, but rather objects of speculation, which the returning currency crises testify to. Another area is the technological development, that by a constantly denser world market integration and intensive global research work also has taken on an autonomous global logic. A third area is the extensive migrations flows from south to north, east to west, but also from south to south. These flows are conditioned by the uneven opportunities for work, education and social mobility, but do also take on a continuously more autonomous logic in pace with, that constantly more ethnic groups spread over the globe develop new family and economic networks across the borders. A fourth and particularly visual area is the media related globalization - the creation of the “Global village”. The 24 hour a day news coverage of CNN and other global networks (that is the global, synchronic time) is the clearest example of this process, that in decisive manner has challenged national news monopolies. The globalization of music, fashion and entertainment programs have probably in the longer run far reaching cultural consequences, but it is however still a relatively unexplored field.
The last area, that Appadurai mentions, is the accelerating exchange of ideological forms, political symbols and utopias regarding “the good life”. This traffic is as mentioned not new, but has been enforced by the communicational opportunities, growing travel activity on the globe, and not least, the growing number transnational or global political institutions, organizations and subcultures (Appadurai, 1990).
One can easily add yet a couple of areas, as rapidly globalized (ecology, health), or areas, that have always been transnational (military technology). The consequence of these horizontal and global (extra societal) logics’ expansion beyond the national borders and deeply into different societies is, that the vertical, local or national (intra societal) logics are weakened. Or more directly, that the national states’ political and regulatory room for manoeuvre gradually is reduced, and that the national sovereignty is depleted. This does probably not mean, that the nation or the state just withers away as liberal optimists and euro-optimists seem to believe. On the contrary the latest development in western and eastern Europe as well as in many other countries in Asia seems to indicate, that exactly the gradual redefinition of the national state will make national identities into a pivotal political battle field in the foreseeable future. A tendency in this field of conflict will no doubt be attempts to consolidate and further homogenize the nation as majority tribalism (ethnic cleansing, “leaching of minorities”, and so forth). Another strategy will be the continuously more global diasporic ethnical groups’ attempt to reconstruct a loyalty - a patriotism - without binding this to the home country, to a place. In other words, a kind of “post-national” identities adjusted to the globalizations’ relativization and repealing of the significance of the place. Finally one can imagine, that the growing number of transnational networks of economic, political and cultural kind to a continuously higher degree will develop themselves into a kind of “trans-nations”, that produce primary identification for the network or the organization, and only secondarily for the members’ respective territorial and state bound national identities (Appadurai, 1993).
In the 3rd world the east Asian miracle economies and the International monetary funds’ neo-liberal standard prescriptions had in the 1980’s sat a new agenda for societal development strategy, namely economic development through world market integration. The background for this change lied in the gradual disintegration of a number of 3rd world states by civil wars and systematic elite-“kleptocracy”. But even more important, a continuous rise in dept burden and marginalization of the 3rd world countries in the global economic cycle.
The market became the new mantra in this “radicalized globalization” in the 1980’s. Southeast Asia, Mexico and east Asia experienced a rapid economic growth, and the most countries - including the socialistic - liberalized their trade relations and encouraged foreign investments. Politically the 1980’s had offered a number of spectacular democratic break ups in the otherwise depressing row of military juntas and authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The military juntas pulled one after another back to the barracks in Latin America, and in Asia the old dictators where challenged in the Philippines, Burma, Korea, Pakistan, and embryonic democracy movements emerged in China.
Side by side with the with the global liberalization of the economy, an intensified democratic revolution in the global periphery and a consequential new openness to globalized news and cultural flows also the global satellite channels, fax machines and video marked expanded. The growth in the supply of global information flows and cultural products coincided with, that liberalization and democracy processes in many 3rd world countries had initiated veritable information and communication expansions internally in these countries. As Stig Hjarvard points out in this issue of GRUS communication and information communities constituted pivotal building blocks in the construction of the national states as institutional and subjective “envisaged” reality in Europe in the 19th and the 20th centuries.
Because of the slow development in alphabetization, infrastructure, urbanization and general communication internally in many 3rd world countries it was not before decades after the decolonization, that the nation and national state began to crystalize itself as an institutional, political and consciously reality in a range of countries. As in the west the establishment of a nationally demarcated public space according to a specific linguistic-cultural and political hegemony was also in the 3rd world countries a pivotal precondition for the development of social and political cohesion, that is a widespread and internalized conception of social community and social entirety in parts of the population.
The particular, and problematic, in the construction of national states, national economies and national identities in the present global periphery is, that the national public space always already is inhabited - and thereby also threatened - by globalized/modern perceptions about culture, individuality, democracy, lifestyle, “the good life”, often expressed in natural and conceptual languages, that are unfamiliar. The mediatization, nationalization and globalization of the public space in many 3rd world societies happen both synchronically and parallel. The problem is thereby, that the for the national identity vital establishment of ideologic “Otherness” becomes more acute and necessary than ever, but also more difficult, because the national Otherness necessarily, ultimately, is an unclear and generalized global modernity, which the national identity at the same time, and paradoxically, seeks to “buy an admission ticket” for. Any construction of the national identity seeks to solve the problematic of modernity, namely to create a coherent society, consolidate a sovereign state, set in motion economic development and create an unambiguous national identity. Only equipped with these institutions to control the modernity can the nation be in evidence and manage itself as equal partner in the global modernity. In order to achieve this is drawn on the thematic of nationalism, namely to construct the national history, the national culture, and the national geography as unique, as fundamentally different from all other and potentially superior to other nations. The project of nationalism fundamentally concerns to control the modernity, to acquire the modern world in a particularly “deep” way in accordance with the proclaimed national history. The modernitys’ undermining of social relations and its equalization can, in other word, only be endured, if it is articulated as unique. The result is a problematic ambivalence in regard to nationalisms’ ultimate ideological object of desire - equality in the global modernity, but a modernity that the national discourse at the same time, resistantly, must demarcate and separate itself from in time (as history), and in space (as territory). The more radically and globalized the modernity is unfolded, the more acute becomes this ambivalence, and the more acute becomes thereby the need to control the national modernity.
A strategy out of this dilemma is the thematization of the global inequalities and hierarchies between nations, that is the pointing out of the imperfections of the global modernity. Within the paradigm of an equal global modernity, that for example UN expresses, the west can be identified as a national Otherness. Anti-western discourses therefore rarely criticize the modernity per se, as an example the discourse of equality and sovereignty (which a such critique itself is based on), or modern technologies and organizations. The critique is on the contrary directed towards the dominating western modernity for hindering other nations in constructing their own particular way to the modernity. The west - as so often a metaphor for globalization - blocks, in other words the individual nations’ right to constitute themselves as effective, strong and proud national units, that is these nations’ attempt to repatriate the modernity. And thereby the west also blocks the ultimate, equal completion of the global modernity.
Another very common way of constructing national identity under the conditions of the intensified globalization is to construct a “substituted - or Operational - Otherness” as the vital obstacle for the nations’ full unfolding and equal status in the global modernity. This substituted otherness can be a minority or ethnic group, that blocks the homogenization of the creation of nation. And it can be a group of “foreigners”, or a dominating elite, who in a perverted form represent and monopolize the global modernity.
Nationalism, xenophobia and religious fundamentalism are really fundamentally not the anti-thesis or outer border of the global modernity, or Otherness, even though they may be articulated as such in political contexts. On the contrary these political and ideological movements and tendencies are integral elements in the global modernity. They are particular strategies in processing of the problematic construction of national, political and cultural identities in the global periphery. A construction, that is problematic, because it happens in a public space already occupied by globalized (deterritorialized) ideological and cultural elements, and because it happens in a global hierarchy dominated by the west. To construct the national community in relation to a “Substituted Otherness” and not the global modernity - is therefore a very common strategy of political legitimation and cultural identity, in the 3rd world as well as the remains of the Soviet empire.
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Anderson, Benedict (1991): Imagined Communities, Verso. London
Appadurai, Arjun (1990): Difference and Disjuncture in the Global Cultural Economy, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 7 no. 2-3, June 1990
Appadurai, Arjun (1993): Patriotism and its Futures, Public Culture, no. 5, 1993
Giddens, Anthony (1990): The Consequences of Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge
Hannerz, Ulf (1990): Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 7. no. 2-3, June 1990
Hansen, Thomas Blom (1992): Sekularisering, religion og ideologi i den moderne verden, GRUS, 13. årgang, nr. 38
Robertson, Roland (1990): Mapping the Global Condition, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 7, no.2-3, June 1990
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'Den vrede hindu: kulturel mobilisering i den globale modernitet'
Thomas Blom Hansen
GRUS nr. 41 1993
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'Den vrede hindu: kulturel mobilisering i den globale modernitet'
Thomas Blom Hansen
GRUS nr. 41 1993
UDDRAG
Globalisering som hypermodernitet
Globalisering som social, økonomisk og kulturel proces fødtes med den moderne verden. Økonomisk som imperialisme, politisk og militært som kolonialisme, og kulturelt som universalisme. Globaliseringsprocesser har deres udspring i den vestlige modernitet, og i de politiske diskurser i mange ikke-vestlige samfund sidestilles globalisering, især økonomisk og kulturel globalisering, også fortsat som vestliggørelse og kulturimperialisme. Historisk set er denne analyse korrekt, og som politisk slagord har lighedstegnet mellem globalisering og ”vesternisering” stadig betydelige potentialer i den globale periferi. Det er derimod mere problematisk i analytisk henseende at fastholde en sådan ”generisk essentialisme”, idet modernitet som erfaringshorisont, kapitalisme/industrialisme som akkumulations- og udviklingsparadigme, og den demokratiske diskurs som legitimerings- og suverænitetsparadigme - alle vestlige i generisk forstand - for længst er blevet deterritorialiserede og re-patrierede overalt i verden. At betragte den fortsatte udbredelse og lokale forankring af modernitetens modsætningsfyldte logikker på global skala som en effekt af en stadig reproduktion af Vestens hegemoni på alle niveauer er næppe noget analytisk frugtbart udgangspunkt. Moderniteten har i mange forskellige inkarnationer og økonomiske udviklingsmodeller for længst slået dybe rødder i vidt forskellige samfund og har her krystalliseret sig i egensindige, re-patrierede udviklingsveje og logikker.
Globalisering er altså i historisk forstand processen hvorigennem en global og heterogen modernitet er etableret. Den aktuelle oplevelse af globalisering som en stadig mere påtrængende, gennemtrængende og autonom proces, og etableringen af denne som et selvstændigt samfundsvidenskabeligt genstandsfelt, bør derfor, som Giddens påpeger, ses som en radikalisering af moderniteten (Giddens, 1990). Giddens påpeger, at en af modernitetens mest centrale dynamikker netop er den fremadskridende adskillelse mellem tid og rum: Modernitetens måske mest radikale transformation af individers og samfunds oplevelses- og erfaringshorisonter er netop institueringer af en universel, homogen tidsbestemmelse. Alle på kloden lever i dag i den samme tid - i tidsregning, i årskalender-tid og i et globalt tidszone-regime, som irreversibelt og radikalt har skabt en fælles, homogen og ”tom” tid. Dvs. en tid, som er abstrakt og ubundet til steder og begivenheder. Begivenheder finder sted i tiden, men ingen lokaliseret begivenhed kan ændre tidens ubønhørlige gang, som fortsætter - tom, åben og universel. Når CNN’s slogan ”The sun is always rising somewhere on the globe” kan opleves som indvarslingen af en ny globaliseret æra, skyldes det netop, at CNN aktualiserer og i en ny form repræsenterer den universelle synkrone tid som moderniteten frembragte. Med CNN kan den globale synkrone tid nu ”bebos” på en ny effektiv måde.
Tidsberegningen blev også standardiseret diakront, som en universel, neutral historisk række af sekvenser - en tidsregning - som alle nutidige og historiske samfund er lokaliseret i. Tidsregningen som en homogen, global sekvens er ikke kun blevet central for etableringen af en generaliseret historisk bevidsthed. Den er også central i civilisatorisk hierarkisering og for nationalistiske rivaliseringsforhold. En civilisation, eller nations, selvbevidsthed er vital konstrueret omkring alder og tidligere storhed. I modsætning til andre nationers relative ungdom eller primitivitet i den tilsvarende sekvens i den homogene diakrone tid moderniteten konstruerede.
Stedet, eller lokaliteten, relativeredes på lignende vis af den europæiske ekspansion med etableringen af abstrakte og universelle præsentationer af rum. Først i landkortet, senere i globussen, og endeligt i de koloniale imperier, hvor det globale rum ultimativt beherskes. ”The sun never sets on the British Empire” blev det første globale imperiums slagord. Det samme imperium, der skabte det stadigt gældende globale tidsregning. På samme måde som tiden standardiseredes i neutrale enheder, objektiveredes og standardiseredes også rummet i sammenlignelige og neutrale måleenheder. En kvadratkilometer er principielt det samme overalt på kloden. Som med den diakrone tidsdimension blev også territorium hermed sammenligneligt, og genstand for konstruktion af hierarkier mellem samfund i forhold til størrelse og for de nationale identifikations-processer, som ideologiske og følelsesmæssigt tog det abstrakte, nationale territorium i besiddelse.
Tidens og rummets universalisering og homogenisering skabte mulighedsbetingelserne for konstruktionen af national bevidsthed og nationer, som på sin side kom til at udgøre den primære, afgrænsende enhed, indenfor hvilken moderne samfund etableredes og forestilledes (Anderson, 1991). Men den nationale enhed som operationel og kohærent realitet forudsatte netop også erkendelsen af en større omverden, ordnet i tilsvarende nationale enheder. Det nationale fællesskab og nationalstaten var altså en måde at organisere og kontrollere modernitetens dynamiske universalisering. Og en måde at begrænse og kontrollere modernitetens principielle adskillelse og ophævelse af tiden og rummet. Tidens og rummets adskillelse og universalisering betyder altså, at mange forskellige begivenheder forskellige steder på kloden potentielt kan forbindes af deres temporære sameksistens. De europæiske imperier beherskede det globale rum, bl.a. ved at indsætte samfundene i den globale periferi i en universel diakron rangorden. Kolonierne eksisterede i en tilbagestående historisk sekvens og dermed på en lavere civilisatorisk stade. Når man forlod Europe og rejste ud i periferien, bevægede man sig også tilbage nedad i den universelle historiske sekvens. Med afkoloniseringen ophævedes denne diakrone afstand, i alt fald ideologisk, og med de seneste årtiers globale kommunikationsrevolution krystalliseredes den universelle synkrone tid som oplevet realitet, og det globale universelle rum som potentielt tilgængeligt for alle. Det er med andre ord den gradvise realisering af en universel synkron tid, som radikaliserer moderniteten, som undergraver rummets, stedets, betydning og dermed driver globaliseringsprocessen.
I ethvert moderne eller moderniserende samfund påvirkes lokale processer af rumligt adskilte og måske tidsmæssigt adskilte processer via moderne institutioners og moderne kommunikationsmidlers overskridelse og beboelse af et principielt homogent rum med homogen tid. Dette betyder også, at lokaliserede problemer eller institutioner kan ”hæves ud” af deres kontekst og generaliseres eller re-patrieres i en ny lokalitet. Denne proces (som Giddens kalder ”dis-embedding - re-embedding”) er ligeså central, som den er relativt uproblematisk i en kapitalistisk økonomi, en moderne statsadministration, og i produktion af ideologisk/kulturelle processer inden for rammerne af et samfund, organiseret som suveræn nationalstat - modernitetens dominerende politiske og sociale form. Udtrykket uproblematisk skal ikke forstås, som om en sådan homogeniserings- og udviklingsproces er konfliktfri. Men derimod som klart struktureret indenfor rammerne af et samfund med formelle og relativt transparente magtstrukturer og et magtcentrum indskrevet i en universaliseret diskurs om nationalstater og folkesuverænitet.
Modernitetens globale ekspansionslogik og dens stadige relativering af samfund, identiteter og etablering af sandheder er principielt drevet af den samme tids-rums adskillelse og dennes gradvise forankring i ikke-vestlige samfund. Denne ekspansion er derimod på en anderledes radikal måde problematisk, idet den ikke foregår indenfor et tilsvarende afgrænset rum reguleret af en nationalstatslig legitimitetsdiskurs. Det globale rum er struktureret og opdelt i nationalstater, hvis suverænitet økonomisk, kulturelt og politisk til stadighed undermineres af modernitetens globale ekspansion.
Kolonialisme udstrakte de vestlige magters nationale rum globalt og gjorde, blandt mange andre ting, det globale rum til en arena for interstatslig konkurrence mellem de dominerende imperiale magter.
Denne første fase i globaliseringsprocessen, som Roland Robertson kalder globaliseringens ”take-off”-fase, havde en række ikke intenderede konsekvenser, f.eks. deterritorialiseringen eller ”eksporten” af sekularisering og demokratiske og nationale diskurser om folkelig suverænitet og kulturel stolthed (se Hansen, 1992). Lokale intelligentsiaers og eliters re-patriering af disse diskurser og den nye verdensorden under Pax Americana skabte grundlaget for globaliseringens anden fase, de nationale bevægelser og revolutioner i efterkrigstiden, og etableringen af en kvalitativt ny og ekspansiv global kapitalisme.
Organiseringen af den globale orden i den 1., den 2. og den 3. verden ”fikserede” globaliseringsprocessen på to måder: Dels i et globalt konkurrenceforhold mellem Øst og vest og dels i et stadigt udfordret og problematisk dominans- og afhængighedsforhold mellem disse blokke og deres respektive ”klientstater” i den 3. verden.
Med den 2. verdens gradvise åbning fra 1985 og dens ultimative sammenbrud i 1989 tog globaliseringsprocesserne, økonomisk, politisk og kulturelt, en ny radikal vending. Verden var ikke længere opdelt, men principielt åben. Hvis den postkoloniale re-organisering af verden kan siges at være globaliseringens anden fase, kan 1980’erne siges at markere gennembruddet i globaliseringens intensive fase. Oplevelsen af at leve i en interdependent og principielt åben verden blev med et slag radikalt reel, både som potentiale og som trussel.
Forud for Berlin-murens fald var gået årtiers dynamisk kapitalistisk ekspansion på globalt plan og en intensiv teknologisk udvikling, som fra 1960’erne fremefter skabte tekniske betingelser for et spring i muligheden for global elektronisk kommunikation, udbredelse af satellit-TV, osv.. I 1980’erne udkrystalliseredes det globale niveau som et autonomt niveau med sine egne ekspansionslogikker (Robertson, 1990), med sine egne transnationale ’kreoliserede’ kultur og livsformer (Hannerz, 1990). Den accelererende globalisering producerede dog ikke en stadig mere glat, homogen og vestliggjort global enshed. Den frembragte derimod konturerne af, hvad Arjun Appadurai har kaldt en ”Global Kulturel Økonomi”, dvs. en stigende ”handel” med og udveksling af institutionelle, politiske og kulturelle former. Globaliseringen uddybede - eller radikaliserede - dermed den differentiering af institutioner, markeder og kulturelle kredsløb, som kendetegner de moderne samfund. Appadurai peger på fem områder, som i særlig grad har antaget en autonom global logik: De finansielle kredsløb, som med nye teknologiske muligheder i svimlende hast flytter massive værdier rundt på sekunder, og for hvilke de nationale økonomier ikke er forhindringer, men derimod spekulationsobjekter, hvilket de tilbagevendende valutakriser vidner om. Et andet område er den teknologiske udvikling, som via en stadig tættere verdensmarkedsintegration og intensivt globalt forskningssamarbejder også har antaget en autonom global logik. Et tredje område er de omfattende migrationsstrømme fra Syd til Nord, Øst til Vest, men også fra Syd til Sys. Disse strømme er betinget af de ulige muligheder for arbejde, uddannelse og social mobilitet, men antager også en stadig mere autonom logik med, at stadig flere etniske grupper spredt over kloden udvikler nye familiemæssige og økonomiske netværk på tværs af grænserne. Et fjerde og særdeles synligt område er den mediemæssige globalisering - skabelsen af den ”Globale Landsby”. CNN’s og andre globale netværks nyhedsdækning 24 timer i døgnet (dvs. den globale, synkrone tid) er et af de klareste eksempler på denne proces, som på afgørende vis har udfordret nationale nyhedsmonopoler. Globaliseringen af musik, mode og underholdningsprogrammer hat formentlig på længere sigt vidtrækkende kulturelle konsekvenser, men dette er dog endnu et relativt uudforsket felt.
Det sidste område, Appadurai nævner, er den accelererende udveksling af ideologiske former, politiske symboler og utopier om ”det gode liv”. Denne trafik er som nævnt ikke ny, men er blevet forstærket af de kommunikationsmæssige muligheder, stigende rejseaktivitet overalt på kloden og, ikke mindst, det stigende antal transnationale eller globale politiske institutioner, organisationer og subkulturer (Appadurai, 1990).
Man kan nemt tilføje endnu et par områder, som hastigt globaliseres (økologi, sundhed), eller områder, som altid har været transnationale (militær-teknologi). Konsekvensen af disse horisontale og globale (ekstra-societale) logikkers ekspansion over de nationale grænser og dybt ind i forskellige samfund er, at de vertikale, lokale eller nationale (intra-societale) logikker svækkes. Eller mere direkte, at nationalstatens politiske og reguleringsmæssige manøvrerum gradvist indskrænkes, og at den nationale suverænitet udtyndes. Dette betyder formentlig ikke, at nationen eller staten blot visner væk som liberale optimister og euro-optimister synes at tro. Tværtimod synes den seneste udvikling i Vest og Østeuropa såvel som i mange lande i Asien at tyde på, at netop nationalstatens gradvise redefinering vil gøre national identitet til et centralt politisk kampfelt i en overskuelig fremtid. En tendens i dette konfliktfelt vil givet være forsøg på at konsolidere og yderligere homogenisere nationen som majoritets-tribalisme (etnisk udrensning, ”udvaskning af minoriteter”, etc.). En anden strategi vil være de stadig flere globale, diasporiske etniske gruppers forsøg på at rekonstruere et de-territorialiseret nations-begreb - dvs. et nationsbegreb som rekonstruerer en loyalitet - en patriotisme - uden at binde dette til et hjemland, til et sted. Med andre ord, en slags ”postnationale” identiteter tilpasset globaliseringens relativering og ophævelse af stedets betydning. Endelig kan man forestille sig, at det voksende antal transnationale netværk af økonomisk, politisk og kulturel art i stadig højere grad vil udvikle sig til en slags ”trans-nationer”, som producerer primær identifikation til netværket eller organisationen, og kun sekundært til medlemmernes respektive territoriale og statsbundne national-identiteter (Appadurai, 1993).
I den 3. verden havde de østasiatiske mirakeløkonomier og den Internationale Valutafonds neo-liberale standardrecepter i 1980’erne sat en ny dagsorden for samfundsmæssig udviklingsstrategi, nemlig økonomisk udvikling gennem verdensmarkedsintegration. Baggrunden for dette skift lå i den gradvise desintegration af en række 3. verdens stater gennem borgerkrige og systematisk elite-”kleptokrati”. Men endnu vigtigere, en stadig stigende gældsbyrde og marginalisering af den 3. verdens lande i de globale økonomiske kredsløb.
Markedet blev det nye mantra i denne ”radikalisering af globaliseringen” i 1980’erne. Sydøstasien, Mexico og Østeuropa oplevede en hurtig økonomisk vækst, og de fleste lande - inklusive de socialistiske - liberaliserede deres handelsrelationer og opmuntrede til udenlandske investeringer. Politisk havde 1980’erne budt på en række spektakulære demokratiske opbrud i den ellers deprimerende række af militærjuntaer og autoritære regimer i Latinamerika, Afrika og Asien. Militærjuntaer trak sig på stribe tilbage på kasernerne i Latinamerika, og i Asien udfordredes gamle diktaturer i Philippinerne, Burma, Korea, Pakistan, og en embryonisk demokrati-bevægelse voksede frem i Kina.
Side om side med den globale liberalisering af økonomien, en intensiveret demokratisk revolution i den globale periferi og en deraf følgende ny åbenhed overfor globaliserede nyhed- og kulturstrømme ekspanderede også de globale satellit-kanaler, fax-maskinen, video-markedet. Væksten i udbuddet af globale informationsstrømme og kulturprodukter faldt sammen med, at liberaliserings og demokratiseringsprocesser i mange 3. verdenslande havde sat veritable informations- og kommunikations-eksplosioner i gang internt i disse lande. Som Stig Hjarvard påpeger i dette nr. af GRUS udgjorde kommunikations- og informationsfællesskaber centrale byggesten i konstruktionen af nationalstaterne som institutionel og subjektiv ”forestillet” realitet i Europa i det 19. og 20. århundrede.
På grund af den langsomme udvikling i alfabetisering, infrastruktur, urbanisering og generel kommunikation internt i mange 3. verdenslande var det først årtier efter afkoloniseringen, at nationen og nationalstaten begyndte at krystallisere sig som en institutionel, politisk og bevidsthedsmæssig realitet i en række lande. Som i Vesten var etableringen af et nationalt afgrænset offentligt rum under et bestemt sprogligt-kulturelt og politisk hegemoni også i de fleste 3. verdenslande en central forudsætning for udviklingen af sociale og politiske sammenholdskraft, dvs. en udbredt og internaliseret forestilling om samfundsmæssighed og samfundshelhed i dele af befolkningen.
Det særlige, og problematiske, i konstruktionen af nationalstater, nationale økonomier og national-identitet i nutidens globale periferi er, at dette nationale offentlige rum altid-allerede delvist er beboet - og dermed også truet - af globaliserede/moderne forestillinger om kultur, individualitet, demokrati, livsstil, ”det gode liv”, ofte udtrykt på naturlige og begrebslige sprog, som er fremmede. Medieseringen, nationaliseringen og globaliseringen af det offentlige rum i mange 3. verdenssamfund forgår altså både synkront og parallelt. Problemet er dermed, at den for den nationale identitet vitale etablering af ideologisk ”Andethed” bliver mere akut og nødvendig end nogensinde, men også mere vanskelig, fordi den nationale Andethed nødvendigvis, i sidste ende, er en uklar og generaliseret global modernitet, som nationalidentiteten samtidig, og paradoksalt, søger ”at løse adgangsbillet” til. Enhver konstruktion af nationalidentitet søger at løse modernitetens problematik, nemlig at skabe et kohærent samfund, konsolidere en suveræn stat, iværksætte økonomisk udvikling og skabe en entydig, autonom national identitet. Kun udrustet med disse institutioner til kontrol af moderniteten kan nationen gøre sig gældende og klare sig som ligeværdig partner i den globale modernitet. For at opnå dette trækkes på nationalismens tematik, nemlig at konstruere den nationale historie, den nationale kultur, og den nationale geografi som enestående, som fundamentalt forskelligt fra alle andre og som potentielt overlegen i relation til andre nationer. Nationalismens projekt går grundlæggende ud på at kontrollere moderniteten, at tilegne sig den moderne verden på en særlig ”dyb” måde i overensstemmelse med den påberåbte nationale historie. Modernitetens underminering af sociale relationer og dens ensliggørelse kan, med andre ord, kun udholdes, hvis den italesættes som enestående. Resultatet er en problematisk ambivalens i forhold til nationalismens ultimative ideologiske begærs-objekt - ligeværdighed i den globale modernitet, men en modernitet som nations-diskursen samtidig, modstræbende, må afgrænse og adskille sig fra i tid (som historie), og i rum (som territorium). Jo mere radikalt og globaliseret moderniteten udfoldes, jo mere akut bliver denne ambivalens, og jo mere akut bliver dermed behovet for at kontrollere den nationale modernitet.
En strategi ud af dette dilemma er tematiseringen af globale uligheder og hierarkier mellem nationer, dvs. påpegningen af den globale modernitets imperfektion. Indenfor paradigmet om en ligeværdig global modernitet, som f.eks. FN udtrykker, kan Vesten identificeres som en national Andethed. Anti-vestlige diskurser kritiserer derfor sjældent moderniteten per se, eksempelvis ligheds- og suverænitetsdiskursen (som en sådan kritik selv baserer sig på), eller moderne teknologi og organisation. Kritikken går derimod på den dominerende vestlige modernitet for at forhindre andre nationer i at konstruere deres særlige vej til moderniteten. Vesten - som så ofte en metafor for globaliseringen - blokerer, med andre ord, de enkelte nationers ret til at konstituere sig som effektive, stærke og stolte nationale enheder, dvs. disse nationers forsøg på at repatrierer moderniteten. Og dermed blokerer Vesten også for den globale modernitets ultimative, ligeværdige fuldbyrdelse.
En anden og såre almindelig måde at konstituere national-identitet på under den intensiverede globaliserings betingelser er at konstruere en ”substitueret - eller Operationel - Andethed” som den vitale forhindring for nationens fulde udfoldelse og ligeværdige status i den globale modernitet. Denne substituerede andethed kan være en minoritet eller en etnisk gruppe, som blokerer for nationsdannelsens homogenisering. Og det kan være en gruppe ”fremmede”, eller en dominerende elite, som i perverteret form repræsenterer og monopoliserer den globale modernitet.
Nationalisme, xenofobi og religiøs fundamentalisme er altså grundlæggende ikke den globale modernitets anti-tese og ydre grænse, eller Andethed, selvom de måske artikuleres således i politiske sammenhænge. Tværtimod er disse politiske og ideologiske bevægelser og tendenser integrale elementer i den globale modernitet. De er særlige strategier til bearbejdning af den problematiske konstruktion af national, politisk og kulturel identitet i den globale periferi. En konstruktion, der er problematisk, fordi den foregår i et offentligt rum allerede okkuperet af globaliserede (de-territorialiserede) ideologiske og kulturelle elementer, og fordi den foregår i et globalt hierarki domineret af Vesten. At konstruere det nationale fællesskab i forhold til en ”Substitueret Andethed” - og ikke den globale modernitet - er derfor en såre udbredt politisk legitimerings- og kulturel identitets-strategi, i den 3. verden såvel som i resterne af det sovjetiske imperium.
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Anderson, Benedict (1991): Imagined Communities, Verso. London
Appadurai,
Arjun (1990): Difference and Disjuncture in the Global Cultural Economy, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 7 no.
2-3, June 1990
Appadurai,
Arjun (1993): Patriotism and its Futures, Public
Culture, no. 5, 1993
Giddens,
Anthony (1990): The Consequences of
Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge
Hannerz, Ulf (1990): Cosmopolitans and Locals
in World Culture, Theory, Culture and
Society, Vol. 7. no. 2-3, June 1990
Hansen, Thomas Blom (1992): Sekularisering, religion og ideologi i den moderne verden, GRUS,
13. årgang, nr. 38
Robertson,
Roland (1990): Mapping the Global
Condition, Theory, Culture and Society,
Vol. 7, no.2-3, June 1990
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The Liberal Peace Thesis
Liberal tradition in International politics
https://modernityandrationality.blogspot.com/2019/07/the-liberal-peace-thesis.html?m=1
Tesen om ’Liberal Fred’
Liberal tradition inden for International Politik
https://modernitetogrationalitet.blogspot.com/2014/12/tesen-om-liberal-fred.html?m=1
Poyan Taherloo November 2005
Prioritizing of the good or the right
The landscape of Critique
https://modernityandrationality.blogspot.com/2019/07/prioritizing-of-good-or-right.html?m=1
Prioritering af det gode eller det rette
Kritikkens landskab
https://modernitetogrationalitet.blogspot.com/2014/11/prioritering-af-det-gode-eller-det.html?m=1
Poyan Taherloo April 2007
A theory of justice by John Rawls
Social justice, ethics and power
https://modernityandrationality.blogspot.com/2019/07/a-theory-of-justice-by-john-rawls.html?m=1
En retfærdighedsteori af John Rawls
Social retfærdighed, etik og magt
https://modernitetogrationalitet.blogspot.com/2014/11/en-retfrdighedsteori-af-john-rawls-2006.html?m=1
Poyan Taherloo November 2006
Liberal tradition in International politics
https://modernityandrationality.blogspot.com/2019/07/the-liberal-peace-thesis.html?m=1
Tesen om ’Liberal Fred’
Liberal tradition inden for International Politik
https://modernitetogrationalitet.blogspot.com/2014/12/tesen-om-liberal-fred.html?m=1
Poyan Taherloo November 2005
Prioritizing of the good or the right
The landscape of Critique
https://modernityandrationality.blogspot.com/2019/07/prioritizing-of-good-or-right.html?m=1
Prioritering af det gode eller det rette
Kritikkens landskab
https://modernitetogrationalitet.blogspot.com/2014/11/prioritering-af-det-gode-eller-det.html?m=1
Poyan Taherloo April 2007
A theory of justice by John Rawls
Social justice, ethics and power
https://modernityandrationality.blogspot.com/2019/07/a-theory-of-justice-by-john-rawls.html?m=1
En retfærdighedsteori af John Rawls
Social retfærdighed, etik og magt
https://modernitetogrationalitet.blogspot.com/2014/11/en-retfrdighedsteori-af-john-rawls-2006.html?m=1
Poyan Taherloo November 2006
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Debate: The Muhammad drawings: Is this a case regarding freedom of speech?
Politiken 13th February 2006
By Henrik Zahle, Professor, Dr. jur., Copenhagen University
https://modernityandrationality.blogspot.com/2018/06/debate-muhammed-drawings-is-this-case.html?m=1
Muhammedtegningerne: Er dette en sag om ytringsfrihed?
Politiken 13. februar 2006
Af Henrik Zahle, professor, dr.jur., Københavns Universitet
https://modernitetogrationalitet.blogspot.com/2014/11/muhammedtegningerne-er-dette-en-sag-om.html?m=1
Politiken 13th February 2006
By Henrik Zahle, Professor, Dr. jur., Copenhagen University
https://modernityandrationality.blogspot.com/2018/06/debate-muhammed-drawings-is-this-case.html?m=1
Muhammedtegningerne: Er dette en sag om ytringsfrihed?
Politiken 13. februar 2006
Af Henrik Zahle, professor, dr.jur., Københavns Universitet
https://modernitetogrationalitet.blogspot.com/2014/11/muhammedtegningerne-er-dette-en-sag-om.html?m=1
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Jews, Christians and Muslims
Berlingske 15th December 2013
Feature Article
By Dean Anders Gadegaard
https://modernityandrationality.blogspot.com/2018/06/jews-christians-and-muslims-2013.html?m=1
Jøder, kristne og muslimer
Berlingske 15. december 2013
Kronik
Af Domprovst Anders Gadegaard
https://modernitetogrationalitet.blogspot.com/2014/11/jder-kristne-og-muslimer-2013.html?m=1
Berlingske 15th December 2013
Feature Article
By Dean Anders Gadegaard
https://modernityandrationality.blogspot.com/2018/06/jews-christians-and-muslims-2013.html?m=1
Jøder, kristne og muslimer
Berlingske 15. december 2013
Kronik
Af Domprovst Anders Gadegaard
https://modernitetogrationalitet.blogspot.com/2014/11/jder-kristne-og-muslimer-2013.html?m=1
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Self-fulfilling prophecy
A self-fulfilling prophecy is a prediction that directly or indirectly causes itself to become true, by the very terms of the prophecy itself, due to positive feedback between belief and behavior. A positive or negative prophecy, strongly held belief, or delusion—declared as truth when it is actually false—may sufficiently influence people so that their reactions ultimately fulfill the once-false prophecy.
Self-fulfilling prophecy are effects in behavioral confirmation effect, in which behavior, influenced by expectations, causes those expectations to come true.[1] It is complementary to the self-defeating prophecy. Examples of such prophecies can be found in literature as far back as ancient Greece and ancient India. It is 20th-century sociologist Robert K. Merton who is credited with coining the expression "self-fulfilling prophecy" and formalizing its structure and consequences. In his 1948 article Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, Merton defines it in the following terms:
Merton's concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy stems from the Thomas theorem, which states that "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences".[3] According to Thomas, people react not only to the situations they are in, but also, and often primarily, to the way they perceive the situations and to the meaning they assign to their perceptions.[4] Therefore, their behaviour is determined in part by their perception and the meaning they ascribe to the situations they are in, rather than by the situations themselves. Once people convince themselves that a situation really has a certain meaning, regardless of whether it actually does, they will take very real actions in consequence.
Merton took the concept a step further and applied it to recent social phenomena. In his book Social Theory and Social Structure, he conceives of a bank run at the fictional Last National Bank, over which Cartwright Millingville presides. It is a typical bank, and Millingville has run it honestly and quite properly. As a result, like all banks, it has some liquid assets (cash), but most of its assets are invested in various ventures. Then one day, a large number of customers come to the bank at once—the exact reason is never made clear. Customers, seeing so many others at the bank, begin to worry. False rumours spread that something is wrong with the bank, and more customers rush to the bank to try to get some of their money out while they still can. The number of customers at the bank increases, as does their annoyance and excitement, which in turn fuels the false rumours of the bank's insolvency and upcoming bankruptcy, causing more customers to come and try to withdraw their money. At the beginning of the day—the last one for Millingville's bank—the bank was not insolvent. But the rumour of insolvency caused a sudden demand of withdrawal of too many customers, which could not be answered, causing the bank to become insolvent and declare bankruptcy. Merton concludes this example with the following analysis:
Self-fulfilling prophecy are effects in behavioral confirmation effect, in which behavior, influenced by expectations, causes those expectations to come true.[1] It is complementary to the self-defeating prophecy. Examples of such prophecies can be found in literature as far back as ancient Greece and ancient India. It is 20th-century sociologist Robert K. Merton who is credited with coining the expression "self-fulfilling prophecy" and formalizing its structure and consequences. In his 1948 article Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, Merton defines it in the following terms:
The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the original false conception come true. This specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very beginning.[2]
Merton's concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy stems from the Thomas theorem, which states that "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences".[3] According to Thomas, people react not only to the situations they are in, but also, and often primarily, to the way they perceive the situations and to the meaning they assign to their perceptions.[4] Therefore, their behaviour is determined in part by their perception and the meaning they ascribe to the situations they are in, rather than by the situations themselves. Once people convince themselves that a situation really has a certain meaning, regardless of whether it actually does, they will take very real actions in consequence.
Merton took the concept a step further and applied it to recent social phenomena. In his book Social Theory and Social Structure, he conceives of a bank run at the fictional Last National Bank, over which Cartwright Millingville presides. It is a typical bank, and Millingville has run it honestly and quite properly. As a result, like all banks, it has some liquid assets (cash), but most of its assets are invested in various ventures. Then one day, a large number of customers come to the bank at once—the exact reason is never made clear. Customers, seeing so many others at the bank, begin to worry. False rumours spread that something is wrong with the bank, and more customers rush to the bank to try to get some of their money out while they still can. The number of customers at the bank increases, as does their annoyance and excitement, which in turn fuels the false rumours of the bank's insolvency and upcoming bankruptcy, causing more customers to come and try to withdraw their money. At the beginning of the day—the last one for Millingville's bank—the bank was not insolvent. But the rumour of insolvency caused a sudden demand of withdrawal of too many customers, which could not be answered, causing the bank to become insolvent and declare bankruptcy. Merton concludes this example with the following analysis:
The parable tells us that public definitions of a situation (prophecies or predictions) become an integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments. This is peculiar to human affairs. It is not found in the world of nature, untouched by human hands. Predictions of the return of Halley's comet do not influence its orbit. But the rumoured insolvency of Millingville's bank did affect the actual outcome. The prophecy of collapse led to its own fulfilment.[5]
Merton concluded that the only way to break the cycle of self-fulfilling prophecy is by redefining the propositions on which its false assumptions are originally based.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-fulfilling_prophecy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-fulfilling_prophecy
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Selvopfyldende profeti
En selvopfyldende profeti er en forudsigelse der direkte eller indirekte forårsager sig selv til at blive sand, ved bare udtrykket af profetien selv, grundet positiv feedback mellem overbevisning og adfærd. En positiv eller negativ profeti, stærk overbevisning, eller illusion - erklæret som sand mens det faktisk er falsk - kan påvirke folk tilstrækkelig til at deres reaktion i sidste ende bekræfter den engang falske profeti.
Selvopfyldende profeti er effekter i adfærd bekræftelses effekt, hvor adfærd påvirket af forventninger, forårsager at disse forventninger bliver virkelige.[1] Det er komplementært til selvovervindende profeti. Eksempler på sådanne profetier kan findes i litteraturen så langt tilbage som oldtidens Grækenland og oldtidens Indien. Det er sociologen Robert K. Merton fra det 20. århundrede som er krediteret for at have introduceret udtrykket ”selvopfyldende profeti” og formaliseret dets strukturer og konsekvenser. I hans artikel fra 1948 Selvopfyldende profeti, definerer Merton dette i følgende vendinger:
Den selvopfyldende profeti er, i begyndelsen, en falk definition af situationen som fremkalder en ny adfærd hvilket gør den oprindelige falske forestilling til virkelighed. Denne tilsyneladende gyldighed ved den selvopfyldende profeti opretholder et væld af fejl. For profeten vil påberåbe sig det faktiske hændelsesforløb som bevis for at han havde ret fra begyndelsen.[2]
Selvopfyldende profeti er effekter i adfærd bekræftelses effekt, hvor adfærd påvirket af forventninger, forårsager at disse forventninger bliver virkelige.[1] Det er komplementært til selvovervindende profeti. Eksempler på sådanne profetier kan findes i litteraturen så langt tilbage som oldtidens Grækenland og oldtidens Indien. Det er sociologen Robert K. Merton fra det 20. århundrede som er krediteret for at have introduceret udtrykket ”selvopfyldende profeti” og formaliseret dets strukturer og konsekvenser. I hans artikel fra 1948 Selvopfyldende profeti, definerer Merton dette i følgende vendinger:
Den selvopfyldende profeti er, i begyndelsen, en falk definition af situationen som fremkalder en ny adfærd hvilket gør den oprindelige falske forestilling til virkelighed. Denne tilsyneladende gyldighed ved den selvopfyldende profeti opretholder et væld af fejl. For profeten vil påberåbe sig det faktiske hændelsesforløb som bevis for at han havde ret fra begyndelsen.[2]
Mertons begreb om den selvopfyldende profeti stammer fra Thomasteoremet, som formulerer at "Hvis mennesker definerer situationer som virkelige bliver de virkelige til deres konsekvenser."[3] Ifølge Thoms, reagerer folk ikke kun overfor den situation de er i, men også, og ofte primært, overfor den måde de opfatter situationen og den betydning som de tilskriver deres opfattelse.[4] Derfor bliver deres adfærd bestemt til dels af deres opfattelse af og den betydning de tilskriver situationen som de er i, snarer end situationerne selv. Når folk overbeviser sig selv om at en situation har en given betydning, uanset om det faktisk er tilfældet, vil de foretage faktiske handlinger som konsekvens.
Merton tog begrebet et kridt videre og anvendte det for nyere sociale fænomener. I hans bog Social teori og social struktur, forestiller han sig en bank drevet som fiktion Last National Bank, som ledes af Cartwright Millingville. Det er en typisk bank, og Millingville har drevet den ærligt og ret ordentligt. Deraf har banken, som andre banker, en del let omsættelige aktiver (kontanter), men de fleste af dens aktiver er investeret i diverse foretagender. Så en dag, kommer et stort antal kunder til banken på en gang, hvorom den præcise grund aldrig bliver gjort klart. Kunderne som ser så mange kunder ved banken, begynder at blive bekymrede. Falske rygter spredes om at der noget galt med banken, og flere kunder skynder sig hen til banken for at få nogle af deres penge mens de stadig kan. Antallet af kunder ved banken stiger, ligesom deres irritation og ophidselse, som igen giver næring til falske rygter om bankens insolvens og foreliggende konkurs, som forårsager flere kunder til at komme til banken for at hæve deres penge. I begyndelsen af dagen - den sidste for Millingvilles bank - var banken ikke insolvent. Men rygter om insolvens forårsagede at banken blev insolvent og erklæret konkurs. Merton konkluderer dette eksempel med følgende analyse:
Parablen fortæller os at offentlige definitioner af en situation (profetier eller forudsigelser) bliver en integral del af situationen og således påvirker efterfølgende udviklinger. Det er et særegen for menneskelige anliggender. Det er ikke til stede i naturens verden, urørt af menneskets hånd. Forudsigelser om Halley kometens tilbagevenden påvirker ikke dets kredsløb. Men rygter om Millingvilles banks insolvens påvirkede det faktiske udfald. Profetien om sammenbruddet ledte til dets egen opfyldelse.[5]
Merton tog begrebet et kridt videre og anvendte det for nyere sociale fænomener. I hans bog Social teori og social struktur, forestiller han sig en bank drevet som fiktion Last National Bank, som ledes af Cartwright Millingville. Det er en typisk bank, og Millingville har drevet den ærligt og ret ordentligt. Deraf har banken, som andre banker, en del let omsættelige aktiver (kontanter), men de fleste af dens aktiver er investeret i diverse foretagender. Så en dag, kommer et stort antal kunder til banken på en gang, hvorom den præcise grund aldrig bliver gjort klart. Kunderne som ser så mange kunder ved banken, begynder at blive bekymrede. Falske rygter spredes om at der noget galt med banken, og flere kunder skynder sig hen til banken for at få nogle af deres penge mens de stadig kan. Antallet af kunder ved banken stiger, ligesom deres irritation og ophidselse, som igen giver næring til falske rygter om bankens insolvens og foreliggende konkurs, som forårsager flere kunder til at komme til banken for at hæve deres penge. I begyndelsen af dagen - den sidste for Millingvilles bank - var banken ikke insolvent. Men rygter om insolvens forårsagede at banken blev insolvent og erklæret konkurs. Merton konkluderer dette eksempel med følgende analyse:
Parablen fortæller os at offentlige definitioner af en situation (profetier eller forudsigelser) bliver en integral del af situationen og således påvirker efterfølgende udviklinger. Det er et særegen for menneskelige anliggender. Det er ikke til stede i naturens verden, urørt af menneskets hånd. Forudsigelser om Halley kometens tilbagevenden påvirker ikke dets kredsløb. Men rygter om Millingvilles banks insolvens påvirkede det faktiske udfald. Profetien om sammenbruddet ledte til dets egen opfyldelse.[5]
Merton konkluderede at den eneste måde hvorpå cyklussen for selvopfyldende profeti kan brydes er ved at redefinere de antagelser på hvilket den falske forestilling oprindeligt er baseret.
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The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
Robert K. Merton
The Antioch Review
Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer, 1948), pp. 193-210
The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
Robert K. Merton
The Antioch Review
Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer, 1948), pp. 193-210
Social Theory and Social Structure
Morton, Robert K.
The Free Press
New York
1968
XIII The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
https://www.uzh.ch/cmsssl/suz/dam/jcr:00000000-7fb2-5367-ffff-ffffd9829ef3/03.28_merton_selffulfilling_prophecy.pdf
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Pavlov's Dogs
Like many great scientific advances, Pavlovian conditioning (classical conditioning) was discovered accidentally.
During the 1890s, Russian physiologist, Ivan Pavlov was researching salivation in dogs in response to being fed. He inserted a small test tube into the cheek of each dog to measure saliva when the dogs were fed (with a powder made from meat).
Pavlov predicted the dogs would salivate in response to the food placed in front of them, but he noticed that his dogs would begin to salivate whenever they heard the footsteps of his assistant who was bringing them the food.
When Pavlov discovered that any object or event which the dogs learned to associate with food (such as the lab assistant) would trigger the same response, he realized that he had made an important scientific discovery. Accordingly, he devoted the rest of his career to studying this type of learning.
Pavlov (1902) started from the idea that there are some things that a dog does not need to learn. For example, dogs don’t learn to salivate whenever they see food. This reflex is ‘hard-wired’ into the dog.
In behaviorist terms, food is an unconditioned stimulus and salivation is an unconditioned response. (i.e., a stimulus-response connection that required no learning).
Unconditioned Stimulus (Food) > Unconditioned Response (Salivate)
In his experiment, Pavlov used a metronome as his neutral stimulus. By itself the metronome did not elecit a response from the dogs.
Neutral Stimulus (Metronome) > No Conditioned Response
Next, Pavlov began the conditioning procedure, whereby the clicking metronome was introduced just before he gave food to his dogs. After a number of repeats (trials) of this procedure he presented the metronome on its own.
As you might expect, the sound of the clicking metronome on its own now caused an increase in salivation.
Conditioned Stimulus (Metronome) > Conditioned Response (Salivate)
So the dog had learned an association between the metronome and the food and a new behavior had been learned. Because this response was learned (or conditioned), it is called a conditioned response (and also known as a Pavlovian response). The neutral stimulus has become a conditioned stimulus.
Pavlov found that for associations to be made, the two stimuli had to be presented close together in time (such as a bell). He called this the law of temporal contiguity. If the time between the conditioned stimulus (bell) and unconditioned stimulus (food) is too great, then learning will not occur.
Pavlov and his studies of classical conditioning have become famous since his early work between 1890-1930. Classical conditioning is "classical" in that it is the first systematic study of basic laws of learning/conditioning.
After reading about the case of Anna O., made famous by Sigmund Freud, Pavlov began contemplating neurosis in a dog. Freud believed that Anna’s condition — hysteria, it was called back then — arose from the stress of caring for her dying father. She was devastated by his plummeting health yet determined to repress her grief and maintain a cheerful face. The result of these opposing psychological forces, as Freud saw it, was a nervous breakdown.
Pavlov thought he recognized a similar phenomenon in a dog named Vampire. The animal had been trained, through salivation experiments, to react differently to two images: an ellipse and a circle. One shape would be reinforced, the other suppressed. As the ellipses were made increasingly rounder and less oval-like, the task grew harder until finally Vampire could not tell the two shapes apart.
And so the poor dog snapped. Originally calm by nature, he began yelping and running in circles, habitually barking for no apparent reason and drooling copiously. Like Anna O., he was caught between two impulses — excitation from the circle and inhibition from the ellipse.
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Pavlov's Dogs
Like many great scientific advances, Pavlovian conditioning (classical conditioning) was discovered accidentally.
During the 1890s, Russian physiologist, Ivan Pavlov was researching salivation in dogs in response to being fed. He inserted a small test tube into the cheek of each dog to measure saliva when the dogs were fed (with a powder made from meat).
Pavlov predicted the dogs would salivate in response to the food placed in front of them, but he noticed that his dogs would begin to salivate whenever they heard the footsteps of his assistant who was bringing them the food.
When Pavlov discovered that any object or event which the dogs learned to associate with food (such as the lab assistant) would trigger the same response, he realized that he had made an important scientific discovery. Accordingly, he devoted the rest of his career to studying this type of learning.
Pavlov (1902) started from the idea that there are some things that a dog does not need to learn. For example, dogs don’t learn to salivate whenever they see food. This reflex is ‘hard-wired’ into the dog.
In behaviorist terms, food is an unconditioned stimulus and salivation is an unconditioned response. (i.e., a stimulus-response connection that required no learning).
Unconditioned Stimulus (Food) > Unconditioned Response (Salivate)
In his experiment, Pavlov used a metronome as his neutral stimulus. By itself the metronome did not elecit a response from the dogs.
Neutral Stimulus (Metronome) > No Conditioned Response
Next, Pavlov began the conditioning procedure, whereby the clicking metronome was introduced just before he gave food to his dogs. After a number of repeats (trials) of this procedure he presented the metronome on its own.
As you might expect, the sound of the clicking metronome on its own now caused an increase in salivation.
Conditioned Stimulus (Metronome) > Conditioned Response (Salivate)
So the dog had learned an association between the metronome and the food and a new behavior had been learned. Because this response was learned (or conditioned), it is called a conditioned response (and also known as a Pavlovian response). The neutral stimulus has become a conditioned stimulus.
Pavlov found that for associations to be made, the two stimuli had to be presented close together in time (such as a bell). He called this the law of temporal contiguity. If the time between the conditioned stimulus (bell) and unconditioned stimulus (food) is too great, then learning will not occur.
Pavlov and his studies of classical conditioning have become famous since his early work between 1890-1930. Classical conditioning is "classical" in that it is the first systematic study of basic laws of learning/conditioning.
After reading about the case of Anna O., made famous by Sigmund Freud, Pavlov began contemplating neurosis in a dog. Freud believed that Anna’s condition — hysteria, it was called back then — arose from the stress of caring for her dying father. She was devastated by his plummeting health yet determined to repress her grief and maintain a cheerful face. The result of these opposing psychological forces, as Freud saw it, was a nervous breakdown.
Pavlov thought he recognized a similar phenomenon in a dog named Vampire. The animal had been trained, through salivation experiments, to react differently to two images: an ellipse and a circle. One shape would be reinforced, the other suppressed. As the ellipses were made increasingly rounder and less oval-like, the task grew harder until finally Vampire could not tell the two shapes apart.
And so the poor dog snapped. Originally calm by nature, he began yelping and running in circles, habitually barking for no apparent reason and drooling copiously. Like Anna O., he was caught between two impulses — excitation from the circle and inhibition from the ellipse.
Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) described a study by one of his colleagues. Dogs were taught to discriminate between two shapes. On some trials, they were shown a circle and then presented with food; on other trials, they were shown an ellipse but were presented with no food afterwards. The dogs learned the discrimination, coming to salivate only on circle trials. Next, the ellipse was made to look progressively more like the circle until the dogs were no longer able to discriminate between the two shapes. Interestingly, the dogs behavior deteriorated in other ways, both inside and outside of the experimental situation. The breakdown, or experimental neurosis, took different forms. For example, one dog might become very agitated and bark and bite; while another dog might become inactive and shy. Even when returned to the original training task, the dogs were unable to respond appropriately. For Pavlov, conflicting excitatory and inhibitory tendencies were the cause of the behavioral disturbances. Extrapolating, he speculated that much human behavior deemed "abnormal" might similarly be due to the collapse of inhibitory processes in the brain. He believed the observed individual behavioral differences among the dogs were due to individual nervous system differences (of which he thought there are four types). Pavlov's work in this area was to inspire later research in abnormal behavior, conflict, frustration, and aggression.
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Pavlovs hunde
Som mange store videnskabelige fremskridt, blev Pavlovs betingning (klassisk betingning) opdaget ved et tilfælde.
I løbet af 1890’erne, undersøgte den russiske fysiolog Ivan Pavlov spytafsondring hos hunde som reaktion på fodring. Han indsatte en lille test tube i kinden på hver hund for at måle mundvand når hundene blev fodret (med et pulver lavet af kød).
Pavlov forudså at hundene ville savle som reaktion på den mad der blev sat foran dem, men han opdagede at hans hunde begyndte at savle når de hørte fodtrinene af hans assistent som bragte dem maden.
Da Pavlov opdagede at enhver objekt eller hændelse som hundene havde lært at forbinde med mad (som for eksempel laboratorieassistenten) ville trigge den samme respons, indså han at han havde gjort en vigtig videnskabelig opdagelse. Som følge heraf, viede han resten af sin karriere til at studere denne type indlæring.
Pavlov startede (1902) fra ideen om at der findes ting som en hund ikke behøver at lære. For eksempel, behøver hunde ikke at lære at savle når de ser mad. Denne refleks er ’kodet’ ind i hunden.
I behavioristiske termer, er mad en ubetinget stimulans og spytafsondring er en ubetinget respons. (dvs. en stimulans-responsforbindelse som ikke behøver indlæring)
Ubetinget stimulans (Mad) > Ubetinget respons (Savle)
I hans eksperiment brugte Pavlov en metronom som hans neutrale stimulans. I sig selv frembragte metronomen ikke nogen reaktion fra hunden.
Neutral stimulans (Metronom) > Ingen betinget respons
Derefter begyndte Pavlov den betingede procedure, hvormed slåen på metronomen blev introduceret lige før han gav mad til hans hunde. Efter en række gentagelser (forsøg) af denne procedure, præsenterede han bare metronomen.
Som du nok forventer, forårsagede alene lyden af metronomen en stigende spytafsondring.
Betinget stimulans (Metronom) > Betinget respons (Savle)
Så hunden havde lært en association mellem metronomen og maden og en ny adfærd var blevet indlært. Fordi dens respons var blevet indlært (eller betinget), bliver det kaldt betinget respons (også kendt som Pavlovian response). En neutral stimulans er blevet til en betinget stimulans.
Pavlov fandt at for at en association skulle dannes, skulle de to stimulanser præsenteres tæt på hinanden i tid (som for eksempel en klokke). Han kaldte det for temporal kontiguitet. Hvis tiden mellem betinget stimulans (klokke) og ubetinget stimulans (mad) er for stor, vil der ikke ske en indlæring.
Pavlov og hans studier af klassisk betingning blev berømte siden hans tidlige arbejde mellem 1890-1930. Klassisk betingning er ”klassisk” idet det er det første systematiske studie af grundlæggende love om indlæring/betingning.
Efter at have læst om en sag om Anna O., gjort berømt af Sigmund Freud, begyndte Pavlov at påtænke neurose i en hund. Freud mente at Annas tilstand - hysteri, som det blev kald dengang - opstod af stressen fra at have taget sig af sin døende far. Hun var sønderknust over hans stærkt forværrede helbred men alligevel besluttet på at undertrykke hendes sorg og fastholde et glad ansigt. Resultatet af disse modsatrettede psykiske kræfter, som Freud så det, var et nervesammenbrud.
Pavlov syntes at genkende et lignende fænomen hos en hund ved navn Vampire. Hunden var blevet trænet, gennem forsøget med spytafsondring, til at reagere forskelligt i forhold til to billeder: en ellipse og en cirkel. En form ville blive forstærket, og en anden undertrykt. Som ellipsen blev gjort stadig mere rund og mindre ovalformet, blev opgaven sværere indtil hunden Vampire endeligt ikke kunne skelne mellem de to former.
Og således brød hunden sammen. Oprindeligt rolig af natur, begyndte han at hyle og løbe i cirkler, vanemæssigt at gø uden nogen åbenbar grund og savle overdrevet. Ligesom Anna O., var han blevet fanget mellem to impulser - ophidselse fra cirklen og hæmning fra ellipsen.
Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) beskrev et studie af en af hans kolleger. Hunde blev lært at skelne mellem to former. Ved nogle forsøg blev de vist en cirkel og derefter præsenteret for mad; og andre forsøg, blev de vist en ellipse men ikke præsenteret for mad efterfølgende. Hundene lærte at skelne, så de savlede kun ved forsøgene med cirklen. Derefter blev ellipsen gjort til stadig mere lignende en cirkel indtil hundene ikke længere var i stand til at skelne mellem de to former. Hundenes adfærd blev i stigende grad forværret på andre områder, både indenfor og udenfor forsøgssituationerne. Sammenbruddet eller eksperimentel neurose, kom til udtryk på forskelligt vis. For eksempel kunne en hund blive meget oprevet og gø og bide, mens en anden hund kunne blive inaktiv og sky. Selv når hundene blev bragt tilbage til det oprindelige træningsforsøg var de ikke i stand til at reagere ordentligt. For Pavlov at se var det modsatrettede ophidsende og hæmmende tendenser som forårsagede adfærdsforstyrrelserne. Ekstrapolerende spekulerede han at meget menneskelig adfærd betegnet som ”abnorm” kan skyldes lignende sammenbrud af inhiberende processer i hjernen. Han mente at de observerede individuelle forskelle i adfærd blandt hundene skyldes individuelle forskelle i nervesystemet (som han mente der fandtes fire typer af). Pavlovs arbejde på dette område skulle inspirere senere studier i abnorm adfærd, konflikt, og aggression.
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https://www.simplypsychology.org/pavlov.html
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/science/ivan-pavlov-sought-a-grand-theory-of-the-mind-not-drooling-dogs.amp.html
https://psych.athabascau.ca/html/Glossary/glossary.cgi?term_id=%221037%22
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivan_Pavlov
https://psych.athabascau.ca/html/Glossary/glossary.cgi?term_id=%221037%22
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivan_Pavlov
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